T he extent of the evolved human capacity for, and reliance on, social learning is unique in nature. These characteristics are responsible for our species' unprecedented variation in behaviour and belief, our rapid rate of adaptation, and our immense success compared with other primates
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. Social learning can enhance and maintain cultural variation-neighbouring groups of people often think and behave quite differently, owing partly to differential transmission of socially learned ideas and strategies. Such cultural variation is often adaptive-different norms, customs and behaviour often fit local circumstances in ways that enhance human welfare 2 . Cultural variation is often valued-groups of people sometimes identify with and seek to preserve their distinctive cultures and prevent their replacement by those of other groups with whom they interact [3] [4] [5] . However, cultural variation can also be lost-individuals sometimes see benefits in cultural change and the adoption of certain out-group cultural characteristics [6] [7] [8] [9] .
Cultural change and sustainability
In all populations, the distributions of cultural traits change over time as the result of demographic processes, individual invention and social learning 10, 11 . However, certain manifestations of cultural change are often deemed undesirable by members of those populations, or by others, for example, the replacement of a disempowered minority group's cultural traits by those of a powerful majority group. Preventing such loss of distinctive minority cultures may contribute to the richness 12 and adaptability 13 of society. Additionally, sustaining certain aspects of cultural diversity may facilitate the maintenance of optimally distinct group identities 14 , which could, in turn, improve inter-group relations 5 and the welfare of immigrants in a host society (for example, resulting in integration rather than assimilation 13 ). Importantly, it is now internationally recognized that indigenous peoples (often dis-empowered minorities) have a fundamental right to maintain and protect expressions of their distinctive cultures, if they so wish 15 . Here we are concerned with strategies by which they might achieve this.
Cultural change or sustainability is, ultimately, a function of the strategic decisions of individuals. For instance, cultural traits are often used as the basis of group (for example, ethnic) affiliation and identity, although the particular traits used for this purpose can vary among groups and over time 16, 17 . Decisions to modify one's group affiliation often entail the adoption of new cultural traits, and are functions of the perceived benefits of, and constraints on, such identify shifts within a particular social context 18 . Furthermore, cultural change can be strategic even without changing cultural identity. For example, efforts of indigenous Amazonians to maintain a distinctive cultural identity while simultaneously adopting and developing new cultural norms that are necessary for survival in a changing ecological, economic and socio-political environment have previously been described 6, 8, 9 . In addition, it was previously shown 19 that cultural values across most of the world's population changed over a 15-year interval, presumably as a result of individuals strategically adjusting behavioural norms to changing economic conditions. At the same time, however, some distinctive values were retained in different parts of the world, resulting in the maintenance of discernible cultural zones. Similarly, it has been shown 20 that some distinctive Tongan cultural traits are declining in frequency among Tongan diaspora communities in the United States (for example, hierarchical family ranks), while others are often maintained (for example, adoption of siblings' children). Explaining such patterns of cultural maintenance and change requires an understanding of how individuallevel interactions in a group-structured population affect people's decisions to adopt or retain particular cultural traits. Currently, our understanding of these processes is limited.
Therefore, from both the subjective perspective of preserving valued cultural traditions, and the objective perspective of understanding adaptive change, evolutionary social science requires a robust mechanistic theory to explain why cultural variation is sometimes maintained under intense inter-ethnic interaction, and why it is sometimes lost 21 . Here we use a dynamic model of interaction and cultural transmission to ask: When individuals act strategically in their own short-term self-interest, under which conditions can cultural variation be sustained? When such variation is lost, which cultural variants come to dominate, and why? Members of some ethnic minorities are interested in the sustainability of certain cultural traits typical of their group. However, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that sustaining such cultural variation can be difficult, given inter-ethnic interactions between groups differing in size, prestige and power. Here we examine the dynamics of cultural norms by constructing a model of interaction between members of minority and majority ethnic groups. We incorporate asymmetric coordination benefits to represent ethnic asymmetries in resource control and bargaining power. In the absence of other processes, we find that sustainability of minority cultural norms may be enhanced by establishing a group boundary that minority members can cross freely, but members of a powerful majority cannot. We show how model predictions can complement empirical studies of cultural change, and demonstrate the model's relevance to our understanding of norm dynamics in an indigenous Amazonian population.
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Several answers to these questions have been suggested by recent mathematical models of cultural evolution. It was previously shown 22 that stable groups with distinctive cultural norms and salient markers of group membership can evolve from a population without such structure if inter-individual interaction takes the form of coordination, interaction partners are chosen on the basis of arbitrary markers, and norms and markers tend to be acquired from locally successful individuals. Similarly, it was shown 23 that marked groups characterized by distinctive cultural adaptations to the environment can evolve if ecology varies spatially, and people prefer to copy behaviour from successful individuals with markers similar to their own. In both of these models, once group structure evolves in a population, inter-group interactions in the form of attempted coordination or cultural copying are invariably more costly to individuals on average than are such interactions with other group members. Thus, distinctive group-level cultural traits coincide with the evolution of mechanisms that effectively curtail inter-group interaction.
Considerable attention has been paid to models illustrating mechanisms by which the cultural traits of one group can replace those of another. For instance, it has been shown 24 that cultural traits with greater group-level benefits can spread when one group out-competes another through relative increases in its membership. Using a different mathematical approach, a model was constructed 25 that analysed competition between groups with distinctive internal cultural dynamics. The presence of one group is assumed to be invariably antagonistic to the growth of the other, and this is used to represent the demographic (and perhaps cultural) replacement of Neanderthals by modern humans. Modelling a mechanism known as prestige-biased transmission 26 , it has been demonstrated 27 that cultural traits associated with successful or prestigious groups can spread through biased copying by people in less-prestigious groups. A recent model of a related mechanism showed 28 that cultural traits associated with groups that attract migrants can become more common in a population as people are culturally assimilated into these attractive (for example, successful or prestigious) groups, although this depends strongly on initial trait frequencies and migration rates. Therefore, in these models, population-level cultural variation can be difficult to sustain if one group is less demographically successful or less subjectively prestigious than another.
In summary, these theoretical models of cultural change suggest that cultural traits typical of a particular group can often be maintained if: (1) inter-group interaction is costly and is thus curtailed; or (2) the group's membership grows at least as fast as that of other groups; and (3) the group is at least as subjectively prestigious as other groups. These conclusions are based on models that share a common feature: interaction between individuals of culturally distinct groups is never considered to be directly beneficial to those individuals. Rather, such interaction is invariably costly on average due to the risk of inter-group miscoordination 22 , is not explicitly modelled 24, 25, 28 or consists only of cultural copying that has an indirect effect on individual payoffs after exposure to the environment 23 or interaction with other group members 27 . In the real world, however, there are often immediate and substantial subjective benefits to peaceful interaction with someone from a different ethnic group or nation. As in the model of ref. 22 , cultural differences may make inter-ethnic interaction risky and prone to failure. However, if it is successful, the benefits are often greater than benefits obtained from interaction with co-ethnics, for example, access to non-local resources, wages, labour or technology 3, 21, [29] [30] [31] . Such benefits are most likely the reason why individual-level inter-ethnic interaction, particularly exchange of resources, services and information, is nearly universal in all known historical and ethnographic contexts [31] [32] [33] . At present, we lack a theoretical understanding of cultural change in ethnically structured populations for which individual benefits from inter-ethnic interaction can potentially outweigh benefits from intra-ethnic interaction. Here we construct a formal model to explore cultural dynamics in such a context, focusing on minimal conditions for the preservation of cultural traits of minority ethnic groups.
Cultural norms and coordination
An important component of human culture comprises suites of beliefs about what constitutes appropriate behaviour in a given context. Such beliefs (or rules) are often crucial to an individual's self-identification with, and ascription by others to, a particular ethnic group. We call such beliefs norms 17 (see also refs 34, 35 ). Norms have a particularly important role in inter-ethnic interactions, because many such interactions have the form of coordination games. In a coordination game, all participants receive a higher (though not necessarily equal) payoff if they act in concordant rather than discordant manners 34 . Consequently, players should seek to interact with others holding similar norms in the context of interaction. Many domains of social life, such as commerce, labour, healthcare, education and marriage 36 , can be modelled as coordination games. Inter-ethnic interactions can be especially challenging because, initially, distributions of norms often differ among ethnic groups 17 , potentially frustrating attempts at coordination. Despite this, individuals often persist in such interethnic interaction because, if coordination eventually becomes successful, substantial benefits may be realized (for example, eighteenth century Chinese-British commerce 30 ). In such situations, people must weigh the greater payoff of inter-ethnic coordination against the greater risk of miscoordination, relative to interaction with co-ethnics.
A model of cultural norms and group asymmetries
Our perception of these issues is heavily influenced by the fieldwork experience of one of us (J.A.B.) at an ethnic boundary in Amazonian Peru. Indigenous Matsigenka who live inside Manu National Park have cultural norms in many domains that differ, on average, from those of majority Mestizo colonists living in communities surrounding the park. Inter-ethnic coordination in domains such as education, wage labour and commerce yields subjective benefits to both Matsigenka and Mestizos, although asymmetries in such benefits may result in differential bargaining power 21 . To engage in inter-ethnic interaction, Matsigenka residents may leave and re-enter the park at will, provided they have community permission. By contrast, Mestizos can only visit Matsigenka communities inside the park temporarily on official business (see ref. 37 for a history of these populations). The sustainability of certain aspects of Matsigenka culture is important to many Matsigenka, as well as to others in the region (for example, park officials). However, it may be the case that increases in the frequency and form of inter-ethnic interaction with Mestizos outside the park in recent years are contributing to change in the distributions of many Matsigenka-typical cultural norms, for example, when Matsigenka strategically adopt Mestizo-typical norms. We are interested in the influence of inter-ethnic interaction on the dynamics of cultural norms at ethnic boundaries such as this, where such interaction may be mutually beneficial and voluntary. With this mind, however, we emphasize that we, as outsiders, have no authority to judge the desirability of cultural change versus sustainability in such contexts.
Cultural change at ethnic boundaries is a topic that is sufficiently complex such that further empirical work, and theoretical models inspired by that work, can both contribute substantially to our understanding. Useful empirical work will address phenomena of theoretical importance, while still being open to the additional complexity and surprise of natural systems. Useful models NATure HuMAN BeHAvIour must be unrealistically simple, so that they can provide insights into the logic of particular hypotheses, while still being guided by empiricism. Here we take up the modelling challenge. The model we present below addresses the dynamics of cultural norms in a group-structured population in which minority and majority groups are culturally distinct, people voluntarily attempt coordination interactions, and individuals tend to adopt the norms of those who are successful in such interactions. We modify marginal payoffs so that inter-group coordination, if it can be achieved, is more profitable to individuals than is intra-group coordination. However, we allow such payoffs to differ between groups. We show that, given plausible asymmetries in inter-group coordination benefits (that is, differential bargaining power), degrees of assortment during coordination and rates of inter-group interaction, cultural norms of minority groups can be maintained if the minority occupies a territory that does not attract majority visitors, or that has a boundary that allows minority, but not majority, members to pass through. These constitute theoretical sufficient conditions for the sustainability of minority cultural norms in the absence of other processes influencing cultural change. This model purposefully excludes much of the richness of real-world inter-ethnic interaction. However, in the Discussion, we show how an application of model predictions can aid our understanding of cultural change in the Matsigenka-Mestizo context and can help to guide future empirical work.
the model
Population structure. Consider a population of arbitrarily large size. There exist two alternative cultural norms in the population, designated norm 1 and norm 2, with p 1 representing the frequency of norm 1 and p 2 = 1 − p 1 . The population is completely divided into a minority group S (small) and a majority group B (big), such that group S has d S times the number of members of group B, and d B = 1/d S . In this model, d S is always < 1. Thus, d k is the relative population size of group k (where k = S or B) when the relative size of the other group is defined as 1. The frequency of norm 1 in group S is p 1S , where the first subscript represents the norm and the second the group. Initially, norm 1 occurs at high frequency in group S (large p 1S , small p 2S ), whereas norm 2 occurs at high frequency in group B (large p 2B , small p 1B ). Therefore, below, norm 1 is always the S-typical cultural norm and norm 2 is always the B-typical cultural norm. The two groups represent culturally distinct ethnic groups. In this model, each norm is always initially present in both groups, and the question of norm origin is left for future study.
Intra-and inter-ethnic interaction. Each time step t is divided
into an interaction phase and a copying phase. During the interaction phase, a fraction m S of group S crosses the group boundary and may interact with members of group B (inter-group interaction). We call these individuals group S visitors. A fraction 1 − m S remains in group S, and we call these individuals group S residents. Similarly, a fraction m B of group B crosses the boundary into group S (group B visitors), while a fraction 1 − m B remains in group B (group B residents). Here we assume that individuals composing the fraction of visitors from each group (m S and m B ) are chosen at random. In Supplementary Discussion B.5, we show the consequences of non-randomly selecting the composition of visitors. In addition to inter-group interactions, all individuals can also engage in intra-group interactions. For example, group S visitors may interact with other group S visitors after arriving in group B. We modify this assumption in Supplementary Discussion B.4.
Inter-and intra-group interactions are modelled as coordination games among pairs of individuals, with payoff matrices given in Table 1 . If two individuals with different norms interact, they both receive a payoff of 0. If interacting individuals from the same group have the same norm, they both receive a payoff of 1, that is, they coordinate. However, inter-group coordination (using either norm) entails an additional marginal benefit g k to an individual from group k (where k = S or B). When g k > 0, inter-group coordination is more profitable than intra-group coordination for an individual from group k. The marginal benefits to inter-group coordination may be asymmetrical across groups. Thus, if g S and g B are the marginal inter-group coordination payoffs for individuals from groups S and B, respectively, it may be the case that g S ≠ g B . In Supplementary Discussion B.7, we show that such asymmetries can represent differences in resource control and bargaining power between the two groups. In particular, the larger g S is relative to g B , the lower the bargaining power of S individuals relative to B individuals. There is no theoretical constraint on the values of g S and g B , and the model allows investigation of any range and combination of values for these parameters.
When deciding who to interact with, we assume that individuals have an ability 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 to choose interaction partners who have a norm matching theirs. It has previously been shown 22 that arbitrary markers can evolve as a solution to this problem of assorting on norms that are difficult to directly observe, and it has been argued 38 that such markers were essential for the evolution of large-scale human societies. In Supplementary Discussion B.6, we explicitly incorporate markers into our model and show that the qualitative conclusions below are unchanged.
We note three strong simplifying assumptions regarding assortment and coordination interactions. First, this model assumes that assortment on norm is unaffected by the frequency of norms in the population. In other words, when a is large, two individuals with a rare norm can find each other to coordinate just as easily as two individuals with a common norm. We modify this assumption in Supplementary Discussion B.6. Second, we assume that the populations of both groups are large enough that the process of choosing an interaction partner is reasonably approximated by a process of sampling with replacement. Third, in this model, we assume that each individual engages in exactly one interaction during the interaction phase of each time step. Note also that the relative population sizes of groups in this model (d S and d B ) represent the relative numbers of in-group and out-group individuals who are members of a single individual's pool of potential interaction partners. Thus, in the real world, they do not necessarily correspond to the relative population sizes of two ethnic groups.
To construct a payoff expression, we first distinguish among pools of potential interaction partners during the interaction phase of the model:
S S B B 
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These interaction pools are shown graphically in Fig. 1 , and represent changes in group composition during the interaction phase. From the perspective of an individual from group S, R S is the size of the interaction pool comprising all group S residents and all group B visitors, expressed as a multiple of the size of group S. V S is the size of the interaction pool comprising all group S visitors and all group B residents, expressed as a multiple of the size of group S. From the perspective of an individual from group B, all group subscripts in equations (1) and (2) are reversed.
We also define subsets of R S and V S :
1S 1S S 1B B B
R 1S is the number of individuals in R S who have norm 1, expressed as a multiple of the size of group S. V 1S is the number of individuals in V S who have norm 1, expressed as a multiple of the size of group S. From the perspective of an individual from group B, the indices representing groups in equations (3) and (4) are reversed. From the perspective of an individual with norm 2, the indices representing norms are reversed.
Given these interaction pools, the payoff to a focal individual with norm 1 from group S is
(1)
(1 ) (1 )
(1) Copying of norms. At the conclusion of the interaction phase, all inter-group visitors (composing the fractions m S and m B ) return to their respective home groups. Individuals then have the opportunity to copy the norm of another individual in their group. We assume the replicator dynamic for copying 39 , such that individuals choose another individual in their group at random and bias their probability of copying that person's norm phenotype on the average payoff difference between their phenotype and the other person's phenotype during the previous interaction step. A parameter μ scales the strength of the copying bias with the difference in average payoffs between norms. Note that if payoffs to individuals are public information (for example, wealth or favours in a small-scale society in which gossip is common 40, 41 ), group-wide prestige-or successbiased copying may occur 26 , such that the choice of potential copying partners is non-random. We do not model such a mechanism here, as we wanted to isolate the effect of inter-group payoff asymmetries on norm dynamics, which is our focus. Incorporating these copying assumptions and the payoff expression above into a recursion for changing norm frequencies in group S yields
where ′ p 1S is the frequency of norm 1 in group S in the next time step. This recursion is derived in Supplementary Methods A.2.
Model analyses
General analysis. Before delving into analysis of the present model, some readers may find it useful to review our analysis of a similar, but simpler, model provided in Supplementary Discussion B.1. Group S (minority) and group B (majority) differ in the frequency of norm 1 (and its alternative, norm 2). A proportion m S of group S consists of individuals who will leave to visit group B during the subsequent interaction phase (bottom). We call these group S individuals visitors, and the rest residents. Group B consists of its own visitors and residents. During the interaction phase, four interaction pools are formed. R S is the pool of all group S residents and group B visitors. V S is the pool of all group S visitors and group B residents. R 1S and V 1S are, respectively, pools containing only those members of R S and V S that have norm 1 (see equations (1)- (4)). Note that, from the perspective of group B, the V and R designations for the interaction pools are exchanged. After the interaction phase, all visitors return to their original groups for the copying phase.
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β term is a function of the norm frequencies in both groups, and thus the βs are not constants. Equation (7) indicates that, when assortment on norm is perfect, the rate of change of the frequency of norm 1 in group S |Δ | p ( )
1S
increases with stronger payoff bias in copying norms from in-group members (μ), a larger advantage to group S members of inter-group over intra-group coordination (g S ), a larger relative size of group B (d B ), and greater variance in norms within group S (p 1S p 2S ). A proportion 1 − m S of Δ p 1S is affected by the frequency of norm 1 in the interaction pool R S , and a proportion m S is affected by the frequency of norm 1 in V S . The sign of Δ p 1S is determined by the relative frequencies of norm 1 in each interaction pool (see Supplementary Discussion B.2). For instance, in group S, norm 1 increases when rare if it is common in group B (both βs are negative, making Δ p 1S positive). Conversely, in group S, norm 1 decreases when common if it is rare in group B (both βs are positive, making Δ p 1S negative). Thus, two corner equilibria, where one norm reaches fixation in one group while the other norm reaches fixation in the other group, are unstable. As the frequency of norm 1 in group S approaches the frequency of norm 1 in group B, Δ p 1S approaches 0 (because both βs approach 0). Therefore, when assortment on norm is perfect, equation (7) reveals stable mixed equilibria in which both norms are present in each group (shown in Supplementary Discussion B.3 and Supplementary Fig. 4d ).
Random interaction with respect to norm.
If individuals interact at random with respect to norm (a = 0), then substituting equation (5) into equation (6) and subtracting p 1S yields This equation is interpretable without reducing to the form in equation (7) . The first inner term in brackets in equation (8) is the difference in expected payoffs between an individual from group S who has norm 1 and an individual from group S who has norm 2, within the interaction pool R S . Similarly, the second term in brackets is the difference in expected payoffs between an individual from group S who has norm 1 and an individual from group S who has norm 2, within the interaction pool V S . Both of these terms are positive when norm 1 is common in both groups (p 1S and p 1B > 0.5). They become larger as norm 1 increases in frequency, especially if g S and d B are also large. If there are many visitors (large m S and m B ), the dynamics may be most sensitive to the frequency of the norm in the larger group (for example, group B if d B > 1), especially if successfully coordinating with members of that group yields a high payoff (for example, when g S is large). The only stable equilibria occur at the corners, where one norm (not necessarily the same one) goes to fixation in each group (shown in Supplementary Discussion B.3 and Supplementary Fig. 4a ).
Similar to equation (7) above, Δ p 1S is larger in magnitude when payoff-biased copying (μ) and within-group variance in norms (p 1S p 2S ) are large. Also similar to equation (7), the rates of change of norm frequencies approaching equilibrium are dependent on the frequencies of visitors from each group. For instance, if there are no visitors from the majority group B (m B = 0), the most common norm in group S yields the highest average payoff (lowest risk of miscoordination) among S residents. However, average payoffs among S visitors are highest for those with the most common norm in group B, which may be different. As long as there are few S visitors (m S is small), norm dynamics in group S will be most heavily influenced by norm frequencies among S residents. If there are no S visitors (m S = 0), then the most common norm in group S increases in frequency unless group B sends many visitors (d B m B is large) and/ or S individuals receive a large payoff from successfully coordinating with members of group B (g S is large). In that case, the most common norm in group B may increase in frequency within group S. If there is no inter-group interaction (m S = m B = 0), then the most common norm in each group goes to fixation within that group.
When assortment on norms is neither perfect nor completely random (0 < a < 1), equilibrium frequencies of norms in the two groups will depend on a mixture of the two types of dynamics described above. Below we use a numerical analysis to examine the frequencies of norms under conditions most relevant for the cultural contexts of interest.
Numerical analysis. Bi-directional visiting. When visitors from each group travel to interact with the other (m S = m B ≠ 0), and assortment on norm is high (large a), the norm typical of group S goes to fixation in both groups if S individuals receive much lower marginal coordination payoffs than B individuals (g S ≪ g B ) (top left quadrants of plots in Fig. 2a,b) . Otherwise this norm is lost from the population (top regions in Fig. 2a,b) . If interaction is more random with respect to norm (lower a), the initially most common norm in each group (if there are few visitors, Fig. 2a ) or the initially most common norm in the larger group (if there are many visitors, Fig. 2b ) can go to fixation in each group (see also Supplementary Fig. 4a ). Because of the benefits to coordination, in the real world we expect people to be very interested in detecting the norms of potential interaction partners and assorting non-randomly, and we expect selection to favour such an interest and ability 22 . Thus, in this analysis, we focus on conditions of moderate to large a. Because of the benefits to inter-group coordination over intra-group coordination, we may also expect people to preferentially interact with individuals who have their norm but are not from their group. In Supplementary Discussion B.4, we show that such a preference has little effect on the results when visiting is relatively low, and makes it a little easier to maintain the S-typical norm 1 when visiting is high.
In this model, when assortment on norm is high, individuals who have a norm common in the other group have a high probability of successful, and profitable, inter-group coordination. At the same time, S individuals, due to their smaller numbers, have a higher probability of attempting inter-group (as opposed to intra-group) coordination than do B individuals. For this reason, S individuals with B-typical norm 2 increase in group S faster than B individuals with S-typical norm 1 increase in group B, all else being equal. The end result is fixation of the B-typical norm in the population. To overcome this effect, B individuals must receive a substantially higher inter-group coordination payoff than S individuals. In that case, the S-typical norm can go to fixation in both groups. Narrative explanations of model dynamics here and below, as well as analysis of frequency trajectories and numerical equilibrium solutions, are provided in Supplementary Discussion B.3.
One-directional visiting. When S individuals can travel to group B to interact, but B individuals cannot travel to group S (m S > 0 and m B = 0), and assortment on norm is high, the S-typical norm 1 can go to fixation in both groups even if S individuals receive higher marginal coordination payoffs than B individuals (g S > g B ) (top regions in Fig. 2c,d ). As assortment on norm is lowered, the initially most common norm in each group attains high frequency if there are relatively few visitors from group S (bottom regions in Fig. 2c) , although S-typical norm 1 can persist in group B at a low frequency (shown more clearly in Supplementary Figs. 3c, 4f) . When assortment on norm is low and there are many S visitors, S-typical norm 1 can be preserved only when S individuals receive lower marginal coordination payoffs (bottom regions in Fig. 2d) . In Supplementary
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Discussion B.4, we show that these results hold when individuals preferentially attempt coordination with individuals who are not from their group.
In this model, eliminating visitors from one of the two groups increases the frequency of intra-group interactions relative to intergroup interactions. When assortment on norm is high but imperfect, S residents with B-typical norm 2 receive relatively low average payoffs within their own group, where their norm is uncommon and there are no B visitors with whom to engage in inter-group coordination. The few S visitors with norm 2 achieve higher intergroup coordination payoffs. However, when they return home to group S, these higher payoffs are diluted when payoffs are averaged together with the lower payoffs of the many S residents with norm 2. Meanwhile, B individuals with S-typical norm 1 receive high average payoffs as a result of inter-group coordination. There is no payoff dilution effect and they increase quickly in frequency. Consequently, S-typical norm 1 increases in group B faster than B-typical norm 2 increases in group S, and norm 1 can go to fixation in both groups. See Supplementary Discussion B.3 for further explanation and analysis.
Discussion
We have examined the dynamics of cultural norms in a groupstructured population in which inter-group coordination is more profitable than intra-group coordination. Modifying the degree of assortment on norm, along with asymmetries in the marginal payoffs to inter-group coordination, is sufficient to generate a range of outcomes, including the maintenance of group-level norm variation or the replacement of one group's norms by those of another. Previous evolutionary models of cultural change in group-structured populations show that the evolution of grouplevel cultural variation can make inter-group interaction costly, and thus infrequent 22 . Such variation may be maintained if groups are balanced in population growth rate 24 and prestige 27 . By contrast, in our model inter-group coordination is both profitable and frequent, groups are asymmetric in size (though demographically static), and individuals from different groups differ in bargaining power (potentially correlating with prestige). We believe that these conditions better approximate many real-world contexts of interaction among ethnic groups. Under such conditions, we show that group-level variation in cultural norms can often be maintained if inter-ethnic interaction is moderate, and individuals do not assort strongly on norm (for example, low a in Fig. 2a,c) . However, such a situation is rarely desirable, as nearly all inter-ethnic interaction then results in norm miscoordination, negating potentially profitable exchange of resources or services between groups. (See also ref. 42 for a model with a different structure that can produce an analogous result.)
In a more likely scenario, the norms of one group replace those of another in the domain of interaction. In other words, individuals from the two groups adopt a single norm for interaction in a given domain, facilitating mutually profitable inter-ethnic (as well as intra-ethnic) coordination. In our model, this often occurs if people can assort strongly, but imperfectly, on norm (or a marker that covaries with norm), an ability that is usually adaptive 22 . The question then becomes, which group-typical norm will replace the other? Our model shows that the norm of the larger group will usually go to fixation in both groups unless minority-group individuals receive much lower inter-ethnic coordination benefits (high a and low g S in Fig. 2a) , that is, they have much higher bargaining power (see Supplementary Discussion B.7). Using a different model structure, a previous study 43 obtained a similar result: the norm eventually adopted by an entire group-structured population is closest to the mean of the initial norm distribution of the group that is largest and/or that receives the least benefit from inter-group coordination (see Supplementary Discussion B.8). The scope for maintenance of norm 1 in group S is decreased, especially when S individuals benefit most from inter-group coordination (g S > g B = 0.5). Note that, although not apparent, at a = 1 in all plots both norm 1 and norm 2 are maintained in both groups at equal (for example, equally high or low) frequencies at equilibrium. These mixed equilibria can be seen more clearly in Supplementary Fig. 4d .
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However, a unique prediction of our model is that the range of conditions favouring the fixation in both groups-and thus, the sustainability-of minority-typical cultural norms is also increased if members of the minority group engage in substantial inter-ethnic interaction, yet live in a place that majority individuals cannot or do not want to visit. Under these conditions, maintenance of such minority cultural traits can occur even if minority individuals benefit more from inter-group coordination than do majority individuals. In Supplementary Discussion B.7, we show that such an asymmetry in coordination benefits corresponds to a situation in which minority individuals control fewer resources and have low bargaining power. This general result, that asymmetries in visiting (migration or dispersal) between groups, caused by geographical barriers or mobility constraints, can contribute to the fixation of the cultural traits of low-power (low-status) individuals, coincides with recent models of language competition 44, 45 . Here, however, our model leads to the specific prediction that, in the absence of other processes affecting cultural change, the sustainability of certain cultural traits of a dis-empowered ethnic minority may be enhanced if they have a homeland that members of a powerful majority do not wish to visit, or with a border that allows minority, but not majority, group members to pass.
Cultural change in any real-world context is surely the result of a complex mixture of many mechanisms interacting across scales of organization (for example, from individual psychology to statelevel institutions). Our simple model purposefully excludes nearly all of this complexity in order to examine the logical consequences of one such mechanism in isolation. Consequently, the model can only approximate a particular ethnographic context in a very crude sense. However, the exercise of viewing the world through the lens of the model can draw our attention to measurable attributes of a population and its inter-individual interactions that may have some causal role in generating observed patterns of cultural change, and thus focus further empirical exploration. We show how the model can contribute to our understanding of the relationship between asymmetries in inter-ethnic coordination benefits and long-term cultural sustainability or change in the Amazonian population of Matsigenka and Mestizos described above.
Applying the model to an Amazonian context. Matsigenka students travel to enrol tuition-free in boarding secondary schools run by Mestizos in distant towns (approximately 10% of adults in one Matsigenka community have attended, therefore m Matsi ≈ 0.1) 21 . By contrast, Mestizos usually cannot enter Matsigenka communities located inside the national park (m Mest = 0), although the frequency of permitted visits appears to have increased in recent years. Payoffs to inter-ethnic educational coordination consist of students receiving desired knowledge, while teachers benefit from student enrolment, upon which a teacher's employment in the regional educational system heavily depends. In these schools, Matsigenka children make up a minority of the student body. Most value their Western education highly and are happy to be there, suggesting that they place less value on the non-Western education they would receive from co-ethnics in their community had they not enrolled in the boarding school (that is, g student > 0). In each individual student-teacher coordination, the knowledge received by the student is likely to be more valuable to her/him than is the enrolment of a single student to a (hypothetically dispassionate) teacher with a large class whose benefits depend primarily on maintaining a class size sufficient to justify employment. Therefore, g student > g teacher , and teachers have power over their students, because they wield a credible threat of expulsion (see Supplementary Discussion B.7). We make four additional assumptions: (1) Western secondary-school education is valued by all Matsigenka; (2) Matsigenka boarding school students who have Mestizo-typical pedagogical norms learn the most in the boarding school, thereby obtaining the greatest relative education-related benefits of anyone in the population, on average (analogous to S visitors when g S > g B ); (3) individuals tend to copy the pedagogical norms of successful co-ethnics (μ > 0); and (4) boarding school students return to their home communities. Note that all of these assumptions are amenable to empirical testing.
Given this ethnographic context, plausible long-term cultural dynamics could entail either the maintenance of Matsigenka-typical pedagogical norms within the Matsigenka communities, or their replacement with Mestizo-typical norms. To the extent that this context is approximated by our model for one-directional visiting (Fig. 2c,d) , we would predict that Matsigenka-typical pedagogical norms are maintained at high frequency, as long as people prefer to engage in teaching-learning interactions with others who have norms like their own (that is, large a). Our previously obtained empirical data 21 suggest that some Matsigenka pedagogical norms have in fact been maintained at high frequency in Matsigenka communities over a generation of boarding-school interactions with Mestizos. If such cultural sustainability continues, we can then look for empirical evidence of a mechanism suggested by the one-directional visiting model: Matsigenka with Mestizo-typical pedagogical norms are rare and so do poorly when they are in, or return to, the Matsigenka communities. Mestizo teachers who accommodate Matsigenka pedagogical norms in the classroom do well. If both are true, it may thus be in the perceived self-interest of all Matsigenka (and perhaps some Mestizo teachers) to retain, adopt or re-learn Matsigenka-typical norms of education. However, if it is observed that Matsigenka-typical pedagogical norms are being lost from the Matsigenka communities despite the reasonableness of the above assumptions, a mechanism other than that modelled here may be exerting a more powerful influence on the cultural dynamics of the population (for example, one of the alternative mechanisms examined in ref. 21 ).
Conclusions
As shown, the model we developed here can be used to generate empirical predictions that serve as baseline hypotheses for researchers who are interested in cultural change in ethnically structured populations, or, indeed, in populations where other types of groups may structure norm variation (for example, communities or socioeconomic classes 46 ). When predictions are not supported, we can direct our attention to violations of the core assumptions of the model, and to other mechanisms that may be responsible for the observed cultural dynamics. If one principle driver of cultural dynamics in this model, that is, ethnic asymmetries in benefits to inter-ethnic coordination, is shown to be an important component of cultural change across a range of ethnographic contexts, it would suggest one plausible strategy for the sustainability of cultural norms valued by an ethnic minority that wishes to continue active engagement with a powerful majority group: establish a territory with a border that minority individuals can cross freely, but that restricts the inflow of majority individuals. Such a strategy would be consistent with the international mandate to guarantee that minority indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and control both their land and their cultural heritage 15 . For many indigenous groups, culture, identity and landscape are intimately intertwined 47, 48 , making land tenure an important component of cultural sustainability. Our model suggests another mechanism by which providing minority peoples with control over their land may contribute to the sustainability of certain aspects of their culture. We encourage other researchers who are interested in cultural change to modify the parameter values, and perhaps the structure, of our model in order to generate predictions appropriate for their particular ethnographic context. It is our belief that such a partnership between formal theory and empirical work is necessary to advance understanding of the complex processes of cultural change in our species.
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